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Abstract
This chapter considers the qualities of  human interaction and  learning that will be most 
effective and natural to incorporate into any interactive task learning agent, and fo-
cuses specifi cally on the interactions involved in learning from  explicit  instruction. At 
the center of this interaction is a process that brings the common ground between a 
teacher agent and a learner agent into alignment. Errors or misalignments to this com-
mon ground drive the interactive learning process. The importance of timing is high-
lighted as is the dynamics of an interaction, as a  communication channel itself, in this 
alignment process.
Introduction
What are the most effective and natural methods for humans, robots, and AI 
agents to interact in support of instruction and learning? To address this central 
question, we begin by establishing a context to frame the scope of our discus-
sion, defi ning the landscape of tasks and learning interactions that we are con-
sidering for interactive task learning (ITL). We then introduce a model for ITL 
and discuss both the support for this model in natural human interaction and its 
implications for learning agents.
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A question of contention raised throughout is: For ITL to be successful, is 
full human-level capability required? Our goal is to lay out the key features of 
human–human interaction and discuss ways in which principles of these inter-
actions should be replicated in  human–agent interactions. Importantly, these 
principles of interaction are implemented in a variety of ways with a variety 
of communication modes in human interaction. Thus, we expect that artifi cial 
agents may use any of a range of modes of communication to implement natu-
ralistic communication principles.
Types of Tasks
In thinking about interactive  tasks, it is useful to consider a “task space” that 
expresses gradients of diffi culty on different scales. For instance, tasks can 
vary from a “simple” interaction with a physical domain (hammering in a 
nail), through an antagonistic interaction with an animate agent (zero-sum 
games), to a cooperative interaction where complex issues of joint control, 
synchronization, perspicuity of contributed actions, and plan reconstruction 
become especially crucial. Another dimension might be a hierarchy of modes 
of transmission of task  knowledge between agents: from reverse engineering 
of a product, to emulation of an observed agent, through minimal (e.g., ges-
tural) instruction, to full verbal and multimodal  demonstration and instruction. 
A third dimension might be computational complexity, which is partly depen-
dent on the other two hierarchies; for instance, cooperative interaction tends 
to be more complex than interaction with a physical domain because it also 
involves modeling another agent. Of course, physical tasks vary in their own 
complexity, too: picking up an egg and separating the yolk from the white, for 
instance, will require extreme delicacy of physical manipulation compared to 
picking up a ball and throwing it away. This three-dimensional space provides 
a way to think about the landscape of interactive tasks.
Consider the following different tasks, representing some of the variety en-
capsulated in this task landscape. The fi rst is an example of a coordinative  joint 
task: a  healthcare  robot that should help an elderly person who is not able to 
use his or her legs and needs help transferring in or out of a wheelchair. The 
actions to be learned (or the interaction with the person) should be fl exible; for 
example, the action “lift the person up” would be quite different depending on 
whether the person is to be lifted up from a chair, from a bed, or from the fl oor. 
Here we need learning as a fi rst step to train the robot to do a safe action and 
also to adjust the action according to the  feedback of the person (e.g., “slower,” 
“careful”). This interaction could take place via language (assuming the robot 
has some knowledge about what these adverbs mean) or by demonstration. 
The robot must not necessarily be able to talk, but it requires feedback mecha-
nisms to give the person being cared for a secure feeling that the task will be 
carried out as expected.
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The second is an example of an agent system that could be an assistant 
system in a car that has to learn when to offer help or information to the driver. 
The system should also learn or anticipate when the driver is engaged in a task 
and should not be disturbed. The system should offer information when it is 
needed, at the appropriate time (e.g., “construction work on the road,” “traffi c 
jam on this route”). Here the agent needs to learn to model the driver and the 
tasks in which the driver is engaged, as well as the individual preferences of 
the driver. This system may need language processing to interpret the driver’s 
language input and generate language feedback to the driver. This is not a 
cooperative task in the sense of equal partners; the agent system is providing 
support and should learn about the needs and goals of the driver through  expe-
rience and  feedback.
Although the agent systems from both examples share some aspects, teach-
ing these two systems would be very different.
Another consideration is that tasks to be learned are often compositional and 
can be represented by, for example, and-or graphs (Liu et al. 2016) or  hierar-
chical task networks (Mohan and Laird 2014; Mohseni-Kabir et al. 2015). An 
overall task can be broken down into subtasks (which can possibly be further 
reduced into other subtasks) with temporal and spatial constraints. A subtask 
can also be decomposed or implemented by primitive actions. Thus, learning a 
task will involve learning how to perform actions at different levels of abstrac-
tion, and this may require different forms of teaching. For example, a primi-
tive action can perhaps be best taught through physical guidance, whereas a 
high-level task with partial order of subtasks may benefi t most from language 
instructions (Chai et al., this volume).
Types of Interactive Learning
Let us now consider the types of  learning found in humans and more precisely 
defi ne which are most relevant to the ITL problem. Forms of interactive teach-
ing and learning differ in two ways: (a) whether or not the modeler/teacher has 
an intention to teach and (b) how it is that the learner learns.
The action of a modeler/teacher may not consciously intend to teach but can 
still afford learning in the learner. One example in natural learning is chimpan-
zees learning to crack nuts: chimps crack nuts and young chimps stay close to 
their mothers, who tolerate “nut stealing,” as follows:
Stage 1: Initially, the young chimp makes no efforts to crack the nuts but 
only to eat them once the mother has cracked them. This keeps the chimps near 
the mother and may lead to observational learning: the young chimps learn that 
nuts can be cracked. This form of learning is often called “stimulus enhance-
ment” (Tennie et al. 2009).
Stage 2: The young chimp starts to bring nuts to the mother, demonstrating 
an  understanding of the “goal” of the task (Boesch 2003).
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Stage 3: At a later stage the young chimp starts to try to crack nuts. Note 
that they do not coordinate the type of hammer, the type of anvil, or the nut 
type, and it takes many years of “ trial-and-error  learning” to achieve success. 
However, many conclude that “ emulation” may be involved since the young 
chimp may have learned something about the kinds of actions needed as well 
as connecting this to the goal of these actions—the cracked nut (Tennie et 
al. 2009). They may, for instance, use the hammer/anvil that the mother has 
left. In this example, the issue is whether chimpanzee mothers are deliber-
ately teaching. Boesch (2003) claims they are, whereas other researchers (e.g., 
Tennie et al. 2009) contest this interpretation. In terms of how learning from 
another agent takes place, Tomasello (1990) and others make the following 
distinctions:1
•  Mimicry: copy the action; the goal is the action in itself.
• Emulation: copy the result of the action using other actions.
• Rational imitation: copy the modeler with an  understanding of the  in-
tention behind the actions. For example, in Gergely et al. (2002), chil-
dren are asked to imitate turning on a light when the modeler turns it on 
with her head, either (a) when she cannot use her arms because they are 
covered or (b) when her arms are free. Children turn the light on with 
their hands in the arms-covered condition (“she can’t use her arms but 
I can”). They also turn on the light with their head when the modeler’s 
arms are free (“she could use her arms but doesn’t, so I should probably 
do the same”).
Finally,  natural pedagogy (Csibra and Gergely 2009) suggests a human-spe-
cifi c type of  social  learning through communication that speeds up learning 
(and avoids  trial-and-error  learning and statistical observational learning). This 
is a form of  imitation in which the modeler presents a demonstration accom-
panied by cues that focus attention on specifi c elements, thus signaling that the 
cues are “intended” for the learner: slowing down,  pointing,  eye gaze, exag-
gerated actions.
Of course, not all  learning takes place through interactions between agents, 
and each type of learning outlined below will have implications for how the 
learning is structured:
• Entrenchment: simply being immersed in the environment, the learner 
is exposed to experience from which to learn. For instance, children 
learn language through being entrenched in positive examples, not 
through  explicit  instruction.
• Self-exploration: the learner is on his/her own in the environment, 
learning through self-discovery and interactions with the world.
1 Note: the precise defi nition and use of these terms is debated in the literature.
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• Structured discovery: something more like the self-learning that hap-
pens in a preschool, whereby the environment has been arranged to 
support particular kinds of self-learning.
•  Apprenticeship: learning happens through emulation and imitation, by 
the learner doing the tasks that are modeled by an expert, but the ex-
pert does not necessarily have explicit instruction interactions with the 
learner.
• Explicit instruction: the teacher and learner enter into an explicit com-
munication about the learner, with the joint goal of the learner obtaining 
some new task model. We are limiting ourselves to dyadic interactions, 
but this type of interaction can also happen in groups.
The learning interactions we consider most relevant for ITL are those with 
 explicit  instruction. When a human partner is interested in transferring task 
 knowledge to an artifi cial agent, we expect this to be the most common form 
for that interaction to take. There may be contexts in which  apprenticeship is 
appropriate, where a person wants to have their artifi cial agent learn by ex-
ample without explicit teaching. For the purpose of this chapter, however, we 
focus on the scenario where explicit  teaching is taking place.
Making the Task Learning Problem Interactive
Baseline Model: Two Agents plus World
Consider the following fi rst approximation of ITL, shown in Figure 7.1 (see 
also Figure 2.1, Mitchell et al., this volume). For two agents, the learner (AL) 
and the teacher (AT), learning by AL can be considered as the improvement of 
the performance metric (P) in the completion of a task through experience. 
Natural interaction between AL and AT shapes the experience, thus increasing 
the potential for interactive learning by AL to occur. Note that both AL and AT 














Figure 7.1 Baseline model for learning between two agents. AL (the learner) and AT 
(the teacher) interact in a shared world over time, W(t). Learning is considered to occur 
when AL improves its performance (P) of a task based on experience.
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as well as each other. The learner perceives  the world (and the communicative 
actions of AT) as changes which occur in the world over time, W(t). AT has the 
possibility to change the experience observed by AL in a way that makes task 
learning more effective and effi cient. Shaping the experience through the AT’s 
actions in this ITL framework aims to permit AL to improve task performance. 
For that, communicative actions also function to keep the  communication 
channel open and make the learner more engaged in the  task learning.
Update to the Baseline Model
Many human joint activities involve what Bratman (1992) calls shared coop-
erative activity (SCA). He argues that SCAs depend on both agents recogniz-
ing that they are part of the SCA, and that they are committed to the goals of 
the SCA as well as to carrying out their part in the SCA. SCAs tend to have 
a clear lifetime with a beginning, middle, and an end. The cooperating agents 
may have to negotiate the beginning and the end of the SCA and thereby defi ne 
the period over which their shared commitments apply.
Further developing the two-agents-in-world model of interactive learning, 
we propose the following changes to capture this commitment to the joint ac-
tivity that is required for natural style interactions with a human teacher:
• Enrich the world state by including, for instance, more than just W(t).
• Enrich the representations within each agent.
In relation to the fi rst change, enriching the world state, the knowledge and 
information that is shared between AL and AT should be explicitly represented; 
we refer to this as common ground. In Figure 7.2, we model common ground as 
a bulletin board that would minimally contain all the task-relevant information. 
Such a bulletin board would include the results of AL and AT’s actions as well 
as any relevant props for their joint actions (e.g., furniture being constructed, 
bed and chair when lifting grandpa). In turn, we can distinguish between WAL, 
WAT (corresponding to AL’s and AT’s own representations of the world) and 
WAL1’, WA2’ (corresponding to the common ground of AL and AT’s knowledge 
of each other’s world state). In general, joint activities are likely to be more 
successful when there is greater alignment between W and W′ (Sebanz et al. 
2006). Thus, each agent has its own actions and perceptions of the world as 
well as a shared model of the state of the world that is built up between the two 
agents. There are several different types of information contained in this com-
mon ground representation. The agents need to maintain agreement/alignment 
on the task-relevant world state, the state of the learner’s task knowledge, and 
the state of the interaction itself. Notice that ITL requires  common ground, but 
also that the learning process itself results in new common ground through ad-
ditional task knowledge.
In relation to the second change, enriching the individual agent’s models, 
we need to differentiate actions into communicative and noncommunicative 
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actions (and perhaps communicative and noncommunicative sensing as well). 
More importantly, each agent could have mental representations of the infor-
mation associated with planning the joint action. For instance, this could in-
clude information related to AL and AT’s  joint  action planning (e.g., AL needs to 
hold the pieces of furniture together for AT to drill a hole for the screws). This 
could also include information about how AL and AT will implement their joint 
action (e.g., AL holding the pieces of furniture at the same time and location as 
AT drilling the hole). In general, joint activities  are likely to be most effective 
when these representations are the same or aligned between AL and AT (Garrod 
and Pickering 2004).
Given this new formulation of the ITL agent model (Figure 7.2), we can 
now consider several different ways that the teacher agent can possibly shape 
the experience (E) of the learner:
• Directing  attention/referring: this can be done by (a) manipulating the 
world to make some features, objects, or processes, which the teacher 
wants the learner to focus on, more salient; (b) using nonverbal com-
munication (directing eyes,  pointing) to the salient elements in the 
world (and in communication); and (c) by communicating verbally to 
focus attention. No matter what means of communication is used, re-
ferring has the result of bringing the two agents’ common ground world 
state into closer alignment.
• Manipulating the timing by which some actions occur (communicative 
and environment changing actions): if a backchannel is communicated 
with some delay, for example, different meanings can be considered. 





















Figure 7.2 Enhanced model with explicit  shared  knowledge (common ground) be-
tween two agents, AL (the learner) and AT (the teacher), in a shared world over time, W(t).
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“give me more information,” or “stop going on about this.” This rep-
resents the dynamic nature of the interaction state, whereby time can 
implicitly move the interaction state forward. Nonaction must be con-
sidered an intentional action itself.
• Providing a task description through verbal communication using nat-
ural language or some description language (which at some extreme 
can be a  programming language): this would have the goal of changing 
the state of task knowledge represented in common ground.
• Demonstrating a task to the learner: this requires synchronization be-
tween perceptions/actions/responses of the two agents and should in-
volve alignment along all parts of common ground. The interaction state 
should have agreement on whose turn it is to act, the agents’ world states 
should have agreement on what aspects of the perceptual space are rel-
evant to the  demonstration, and the demonstration itself should make a 
modifi cation to the  shared understanding of the task knowledge state.
We argue that this update to the learning agent model is what makes the learning 
process interactive, particularly when the interaction is with human partners. 
In the remainder of this chapter we describe ways in which  human interaction 
is driven by the need to maintain these different aspects of common ground 
between agents. We fi rst lay out more specifi cally what common ground means 
for an interaction, followed by how common ground is repaired when errors or 
misalignments arise. Thereafter we discuss how many important elements and 
characteristics of human interaction stem from the rather strict timing dynam-
ics involved in maintaining common ground over an interaction. Finally, we 
close with a discussion of the multiple modalities humans use for such learning 
interactions and the extent to which agents need to have humanlike interaction 
abilities.
Common Ground
The “classical” version of common ground comes out of philosophy as a way 
of handling some of the ways in which languages distinguish material that is 
new to the interaction from older information that is already established (e.g., 
an oversimplifi ed way of mapping onto the distinction between “a” and “the”). 
Common ground is normally considered to have different components:
• Basic facts taken for granted (e.g., we are in Germany, it’s summer, 
gravity reigns on Earth, the capital of the U.S.A. is Washington, D.C.)
• The things in front of us that are mutually manifest (e.g., the books on 
the table in front of us both)
• The activity (or task) in which we are engaged
• How far we have progressed on that task
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• Tacit pacts about referring expressions (e.g., once we have referred to 
object X as “the O-ring” we should continue to use that expression)
Think about this as a blackboard: each time agents introduce entities and 
propositions, we add them to the list, so common ground is quintessentially 
incremental.
This classical version has problems. It assumes, for example, that every-
thing interactant A believes, B should believe as well; there is no possibility 
of a quarrel or disagreement in such a world. Or, more relevantly for  robotics, 
there is no individuation of what A and B know from what a new agent C 
knows. Thus, in such a learning environment, each agent must have its own 
“commitment slate”: C’s slate can be updated by interaction with A or B. For 
informational and skills learning tasks, the whole point of interaction is this 
updating, but the updating will happen in all cases: if we are moving a table 
together, we will serially update the location and orientation of the table.
In  human–human interactions there are some categories of things that are 
assumed to be in common ground, such as naïve physics of the world/objects, 
referents which by default have space/time recency, actions that are usually 
rational (effi cient with respect to goals), and other forms of common sense for 
humans. Agent designers should keep these aspects of human common ground 
in mind when considering what must be included in the innate abilities of an 
effective interactive agent. It would be great to have agents with these aspects 
of prior knowledge, but at the very least, agents should be able to communicate 
their limitations in background knowledge.
Developmental Trajectory of Grounding, Informing, and Referring
Babies start to take part in synchronized, dyadic exchanges early in life; there 
are arguments as to how early this happens, but defi nitely by two months of 
age (Feldman 2007). By around six months, dyadic games are well established 
(e.g., peekaboo, vocalization exchanges) (Rochat et al. 1999). At around nine 
months, infants show the beginnings of “intention reading/social cognition”; 
that is, the understanding that both they and others have communicative inten-
tions (Tomasello 2008). This is signaled by episodes of  joint  attention in which 
the child and caregiver are sharing attention to the same object (Cameron-
Faulkner et al. 2015) and making this manifest by  gaze checking, mutual 
laughing, and  pointing (Callaghan et al. 2011). Pointing has been much stud-
ied, and by about 12 months, babies point to share information, to inform, and 
to correct. Evidence for this comes from changes in the frequency/intensity of 
points dependent on caregiver response (Liszkowski et al. 2012). Tomasello 
(2003) stresses that the “gavagai” problem (Quine 1960) of referential ambigu-
ity can only be solved through this system of  intention reading, which allows 
the child to map the form of another’s utterance to an inference about their 
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intention in uttering it. Further, he argues that the rapid increase in word learn-
ing that occurs in the second year of life is dependent on intention reading.
In the early stages of language development, caregivers are usually the 
ones to provide common ground. Knowing what a toddler means can be very 
problematic without shared  background  knowledge and common ground. For 
instance, toddlers will use referring expressions like “it” without having previ-
ously used an identifying noun. But children start using determiners and pro-
nouns in discourse fairly correctly (e.g., the use of “a” to introduce a referent 
and “the” for further mention) before the age of three. However, if usage is 
probed in experimental situations, it becomes clear that the subtleties of use 
(e.g., sensitivity to whether the interlocutor can or cannot see what is being 
referred to) take quite some time to develop (Matthews et al. 2006). If children 
are put into “standard” referential communication tasks where they have to 
identify a minimally different referent to a partner, their performance is sur-
prisingly poor, both in terms of the identifying descriptions that they give and 
in terms of asking for clarifi cation (Lloyd et al. 1995).
Grounding and Egocentricity
When a speaker refers to something  as “the cup” (as opposed to “the big cup” 
or “the middle-sized cup”), this is supposed to indicate that there is only one 
cup in the  common ground. However, when a speaker says “the middle-sized 
cup,” this is supposed to indicate that s/he is referring to only one out of many 
possible cups in the common ground (i.e., the second largest of three cups). 
In other words, speaker and listener are assumed to take into account both 
the speaker’s and the listener’s perspectives on what they are looking at when 
making such references. However, there is much evidence to suggest that even 
skilled adult speakers and listeners do not always take common ground fully 
into account when referring to objects in a scene. Keysar et al. (2000) have 
carried out various experiments in which they arrange tableaux of objects, 
such that the speaker and listener have different views of those tableaux, and 
it is quite apparent to both that they have different views. For example, the 
speaker may see three cups (a big, middle-sized, and small one) whereas the 
listener can only see two (a middle-sized and a small cup). When describing 
the cup that is “middle-sized” from the speaker’s perspective, which is actu-
ally the largest cup for the listener, the speaker will often refer to it as “the 
middle cup.” In other words, the speaker will often refer from an egocentric 
perspective, not taking into account what is in common ground and available 
to both speaker and listener. Conversely, if the arrangement is the other way 
around—the speaker sees only two cups while the listener sees three—when 
the listener hears “the big cup,” s/he will often look at what is the largest 
cup from his/her perspective, but not from the speaker’s. In other words, the 
listener also tends to follow an egocentric perspective on what should be in 
common ground when s/he interprets the speaker’s references. The effects are 
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particularly pronounced when the speaker and listener are under time pressure, 
suggesting that common ground is not always fully taken into account even by 
skilled adult speakers and listeners.
This process is even more complex for robots and AI agents in that being 
physically present in the same space does not mean that humans and robots 
have the same perceptual access to the shared environment. A robot has much 
different perceptual, motor, and  reasoning capabilities than a human. The ro-
bot’s representation of the shared world is signifi cantly misaligned from the 
human’s. The lack of a joint representation makes grounding between  humans 
and robots extremely challenging, yet essential for the success of an interac-
tion and a baseline from which learning can take place. As shown by Chai et 
al. (2016), humans and robots will need to make extra effort to bridge the gap 
and strive for a common ground of shared representations.
In the context of ITL, it is reasonable to assume that humans may be bet-
ter than robots at detecting and remedying missing common ground. Thus, it 
is important for the robot to take extra effort to provide suffi cient cues to as-
sist the human in detecting and repairing missing common ground in a timely 
fashion. One potential device is to make the robot’s internal representations 
transparent to the human through, for example, language description or visual 
display (Alexandrova et al. 2014; Hayes and Shah 2017). Another device is 
through confi rmation, commonly employed in dialogue to help establish com-
mon ground. There are two types of confi rmation: (a) explicit confi rmation, 
where an agent always explicitly asks for a confi rmation about its  understand-
ing (e.g., “you are talking about this cup, correct?”), and (b) implicit confi rma-
tion, where the agent provides an implicit confi rmation of understanding, as 
through the relevant actions on their next turn (Litman and Pan 2002). There 
are trade-offs between explicit and implicit confi rmations. Explicit confi rma-
tions make it easier for humans to correct mistakes and can lead to better task 
success rate, but they are cumbersome and can result in lengthy interactions. 
Implicit confi rmations are much more natural and quick, but there is risk in the 
delay of detecting and repairing mistakes. In  human–robot referential commu-
nication, studies have shown that the robot’s belief of the reference (referred 
to by the human) may often not be the same as the reference intended by the 
human (Chai et al. 2016). In this case, if the robot replies a generic “got it,” 
this may fool the human into believing that common ground has been estab-
lished when in fact it has not. This simple acceptance from the robot is more 
detrimental to common ground than a simple rejection (“I don’t get it”). When 
the robot provides information about its internal representation of the believed 
reference (e.g., through language descriptions), common ground can be signifi -
cantly improved. Thus, it is important for the agent to adapt different types of 
confi rmation under different situations.
In addition to handling explicit communication about common ground, 
agents need to account for the fact that much of the common ground be-
tween humans is inferred implicitly rather than explicitly discussed, as in the 
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goal-directed action inference example mentioned previously. When children 
see a woman hitting the light with her head when her arms are free, thus in-
dicating that the use of the head is intended since her hands could have been 
used, they interpret this as an instrumental action (hitting the light) and a non-
instrumental action (not using the most effi cient means available), which im-
plicitly communicates that the goal of the task includes the action of hitting 
with the head, not just turning the light on (Gergely et al. 2002).
Bringing the perceptual and action capabilities of robots or AI systems to 
human levels will certainly help with most of the common ground issues and 
could enable interactions at the level of human–human interactions. However, 
realizing this is extremely challenging. Alternatively, if robots had all the ca-
pabilities necessary to perform the range of tasks they might need to learn and 
there was broad acceptance and usage of best practices for ITL implementa-
tions across robots and AI agents, humans might get used to the robot’s limi-
tations and still interact with them smoothly. This is similar to how humans 
interact with pets, where the expectations are lower but accurate.
Humanlike transparency mechanisms (e.g.,  gaze,  pointing,  head gesturing) 
can exploit people’s ability to interpret mechanisms without any instruction 
or training. Implementing those mechanisms with precision in robots, how-
ever, is diffi cult. Also, robots performing these actions might bring an addi-
tional expectation that the robot can also process such information from the 
human, which is even more challenging. Instead, visual transparency channels 
on a robot, such as a screen or projection from the robot onto the environment 
(which are not afforded in human–human interactions), can afford high band-
width visual information transfer and might be effective in human–machine 
interactions.
Repairing Misalignments in Common Ground
Next let us now turn our attention to the concept of “errors” in common ground. 
In a sense, this is the entire reason for a learning interaction at all: to repair the 
misalignment in common ground between a teacher and a learner. Errors trig-
ger the requirement for an ITL process. Without errors there would be no need 
for ITL. Continually throughout an interaction, misalignments in all aspects of 
common ground are being detected, diagnosed, and repaired.
Detection happens through  self-monitoring (broken expectations in per-
ceptions or actions), implicit  feedback (back channel), and explicit feedback 
(“stop, that was wrong”). There are many different sources of error to be de-
tected and diagnosed:
•  Perception  errors occur during perception (e.g., the agent fails to per-
ceive an object in the world).
•  Task execution errors are caused by faulty execution of an action in the 
world (e.g., the robot does not reach an object in the world).
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• Representation errors encompass misconceptions as well as incom-
plete or incorrect task representations. This is related to the Brown and 
VanLehn (1980) generative theory of human misconceptions, or bugs, 
which can be seen as resulting from procedural skills acting on incom-
plete or incorrect procedures (i.e., tasks).
• Communication errors result from a lack of common ground or inad-
equate mechanisms (e.g., feedback) to sustain the fl ow of communica-
tion with the teacher agent.
•  Anticipation errors occur in the  prediction mechanisms of the agent 
and lead to expectations (future state of the world) that are not possible 
to meet, given the available actions and resources.
Once an error is detected, it can be self-diagnosed and repaired or the diagno-
sis and repair can happen through subsequent interaction. In human conversa-
tion, self-corrected repairs can be nearly immediate (within ca. 700 msec, at a 
rate of about once every 80 sec; Dingemanse et al. 2015). But situations that 
Norman (1981) refers to include longer time-frame errors, as do many that 
Reason (1990) discusses.
Human Interaction Is Built to Minimize Errors
When repairing errors  or misunderstandings in dialogue, effort is distributed 
between the two interlocutors. In the following telephone conversation (from 
Drew 1997), for instance, the listener helps the speaker detect the source of 
confusion (the word “gorillas”) by interrupting with “forty-nine what?”
Hal: .an‘ Leslie ’t was marv’lous (.) D’you know he had (.) forty nine [?] 
g’rillas. .hh th-there. (b) (.) br[eeding in ( )  [?]
Lesley: [pf- f- Forty nine what?  [?]
Hal: G’rillas.  [?]
Dingemanse et al. (2015) argue that the effort of  identifying the source of the 
problem to be repaired and repairing it is nicely distributed between the two 
interlocutors to minimize the time spent repairing the dialogue.
In thinking about how errors in  robot–human interaction could be handled, 
it is useful to refer to the human–human system and to try to extract general 
principles that might be useful. Let us take the language user and consider 
the production or execution system. The person starts out with an  intention, 
recodes this into a semantic specifi cation, which in turns gets recoded into a 
syntactic specifi cation, which is then fl eshed out in an abstract sound system 
(phonology), which in turn is recoded into articulatory (muscular) instructions. 
At every representational level, the human system probably does  error check-
ing (e.g., legal expression checking, checking the derivation form for each 
of the prior levels). What we know with certainty is that there are two self-
monitoring levels: a so-called “inner loop,” which is prearticulatory, and an 
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“outer loop,” where as one says something, one checks that it corresponds to 
the intended sequence. In many cases, the inner loop can catch errors before 
there is any overt sign at all. At other times, there may be some mild perturba-
tion (e.g., a pause or vocalization, “um”) in the overt signal. Where the error 
is detected by the external loop, the speaker  interrupts herself with an audible 
glottal closure, signaling “oops,” and then recycles the earlier delivered chunk 
back to the point of the error: “You go left at the corn… you go RIGHT at the 
corner.” At this point the speaker may think she has completed her turn, but the 
interlocutor may now miss the beat (ca. 200 msec after the turn ends), at which 
point a response is expected (perhaps also leaning forward or frowning), indi-
cating some possible hitch in  comprehension. This provides a space (ca. 300 
msec) for the error speaker to self-repair or augment, “You go left at the corn… 
you go right at the corner, (500 msec) at the intersection.” If the speaker misses 
this opportunity, the addressee in diffi culty can still trigger (initiate) self-repair 
by the original speaker:
A: “You go left at the corn… you go right at the corner, (500 msec) at the 
intersection.”
B: “The intersection of Bryant and East Street?”
A: “Yes, by the 7Eleven.”
Sometimes, the  misunderstanding only becomes apparent later:
A: Do you know who’s going to the meeting?
B: No, who?
A: I don’t know…
Here the response to B’s turn displays a misunderstanding that A’s turn was a 
preliminary to a telling, when in fact, as turn three makes clear, it was a simple 
question. This illustrates the utility of a communication system that alternates 
short turns across speakers; the responses indicate whether the prior turns were 
understood as intended (Sacks et al. 1974).
By looking at the whole system of incremental possibilities of repair, one 
sees that the whole interaction system is designed to give multiple successive 
opportunities to catch misunderstandings and errors (Schegloff et al. 1977). The 
system is optimized for effi ciency, fi rst within the speaker’s self-monitoring 
loops, then through overt self-repair (where the speaker foresees errors or up-
coming misunderstandings), then through a pause inviting self-repair, and fi -
nally (and reluctantly) through other-initiation of repair. The latter involves an 
inserted, potentially disruptive sequence. The disruption is minimized by an 
ordered preference of types of other initiation: the listener that does not under-
stand gives a precise localization of the problem (“the intersection of Bryant 
and East Street?” is more effi cient than “Where?”). Interestingly, the sum of 
the length of initiator and repair tends to be no longer than the original trouble-
some utterance (Dingemanse et al. 2015). One reason for this effi ciency is that 
other-initiation of repair occurs every 80 sec in natural conversation.
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Learning from Mistakes
What does it mean to be wrong? What do errors tell you? One explanation is 
that what you did was wrong and requires follow-up; however, there are sev-
eral learning paradigms in which errors are integral parts of the learning pro-
cess (Lorenzet et al. 2005). There is utility in exploration. Importantly, though, 
there must be bounds beyond which the learner knows it cannot be allowed to 
go, based on safety or cost (or other criteria). The role of errors may be differ-
ent for humans and agents. For example, children may need to make an error 
to learn effectively from it. However, a robot may have a learning mechanism 
that allows it to learn based on communication that substitutes for the experi-
ence of actually making the error.
Children sometimes make errors on purpose, to gain a better  understanding 
about the consequences of some action and better predict the future. If an ac-
tion and its consequence are not known by the child, the child will be curious 
to explore it. What happens if the glass falls? Does it break? Does it not break? 
What happens after a glass has broken? Exploring this gives the child a more 
complete picture of the world.
For robots it is also important to explore the environment and to explore 
what works and what does not (within a certain range, of course). If a glass is 
grabbed too hard, it will break; if the door handle is turned too gently, it will 
not move. Exploring the range of different outcomes from an action gives a 
better and richer representation to operate more fl exibly.
For these kinds of “errors,” which function more as exploration actions, the 
robot/child will probably need to realize on their own when an error occurs. 
For some types of errors, this might not be obvious to the robot, thus neces-
sitating the support of the teacher. Support is also needed if the reason for 
an error is unknown to an agent. In the end, it is crucial to know what action 
would not cause the error.
Controlling and guiding this exploration process is an important role that 
the human teacher can play for the learner; that is, helping the learner collect 
the most informative “near miss” examples that will lead to  generalization.
Learning systems can end up in a sort of good enough, less than optimal 
state (e.g., Klein and Perdue 1997). Consider a landscape of solutions where 
there are many, locally optimal, sort of OK solutions, but only one or two op-
timal solutions. For a machine to escape from its less than optimal cul-de-sac, 
it will need to be nudged out of its local optimum and forced to explore the 
larger landscape of possibilities. This can be achieved, as in Bayesian model-
ing of fi tness landscapes, by perturbing the current state: the system is forced 
to go downhill for a bit and then starts to climb another incline that may turn 
out to be the global maximum (e.g., Markov chain, Monte Carlo, Metropolis 
coupling in Bayesian phylogenetics, as in Reesink et al. 2009). Gray and 
Lindstedt (2017) talk about “plateaus, dips, and leaps” (see also Gray et al., 
this volume). “Plateaus” contrast with “asymptotes” (Gray 2017). Asymptotes 
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refl ect performance at a theoretical limit whereas plateaus are periods of stable 
but suboptimal performance. Better methods can yield better performance but 
the agent may not have knowledge of the better method or possess the skills 
required to master the method, or simply not care to get better.
Different  teaching styles result in different ways that a misalignment on 
task knowledge is handled. Consider the following  task instruction scenarios:
• Marie is a preschool teacher who wants to teach her students how to 
mix colors to obtain other colors. Instead of just telling them the dif-
ferent combinations, she uses a technique called “provocation.” She 
presents the students with an uncolored picture of a frog and two tubes 
of color: blue and yellow. She says “this is all we have, what should 
we do?” Some students will give up and say that it is not possible; 
others will paint the frog blue or yellow (which is not considered a 
mistake); a few will try something new and mix the colors to obtain 
green. Children who go through this discovery process are much more 
likely to remember the outcome than those who are just told about it or 
observe it (Craft 2001).
• Kenan is a carpenter certifi ed to teach woodworking. He regularly works 
with  apprentices at his workshop. When apprentices start working at the 
shop, Kenan fi rst assesses skill levels by having them perform basic ac-
tions, such as cutting with a saw or sanding. He gives them a task like 
“cut all this wood into 16 cm pieces,” commensurate with skill level. 
When teaching a new task, Kenan uses a supervised discovery process. 
He tells the apprentice to attempt the task and  interrupts them when they 
go wrong. For example, he may tell an apprentice, who has never previ-
ously done the task, to glue two pieces of wood together. If the apprentice 
goes down a wrong path, such as starting to apply glue before making 
certain that the surfaces to be glued have been sanded completely fl at, he 
then interrupts the apprentice’s work to bring him/her back to the correct 
path. When  teaching how to use more dangerous cutting and milling ma-
chines, Kenan fi rst demonstrates the use of the machine and then tightly 
supervises apprentices as they try to use the machine.
One key difference between these scenarios is the extent to which mistakes 
by the learner are allowed, or even encouraged, as a function of situational 
characteristics. The same provocation-based  discovery learning process that 
is entirely appropriate in the context of interactions meant to improve under-
standing of color may be inadvisable in the context of interactions meant to 
improve woodworking knowledge and skill. Kenan cannot afford to let his 
apprentices explore possible paths that might lead to waste of expensive re-
sources and, perhaps even more importantly, an increase in risk of harm. The 
woodworker’s blade is less forgiving than the artist’s brush. The difference 
between these two scenarios may greatly impact the role of exploration needed 
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for ITL in robots and AI agents. It also emphasizes the important role of situa-
tion understanding and contextual  reasoning in selecting modes of interaction.
Interaction Timing and Synchronization
So far we have focused primarily on the substantive context and content of 
 interaction, leaving implicit in the discussion an inherent characteristic of all 
interaction: it progresses over time. Timing of an activity is separate from con-
tent. In this section we detail the importance of timing as a fi rst principle of 
the interaction.
Correct timing and synchronization are crucial in many aspects of human 
interaction. The turn-taking system in conversation operates with ca. 200 msec 
turnaround (Stivers et al. 2009), the normal human minimum response time 
for the simplest preplanned response. This is far too short for planning spoken 
utterances, which generally require at least 1 sec (600 msec for a single word, 
1500 msec for a simple clause) before output can begin (see Levinson, this 
volume). This implies that speakers are predicting the ends of the incoming 
turn and  planning their own so that they are ready to respond on time. The 
speed may have origins in the phylogeny of our communication system, before 
the complexity of linguistic signals developed (Levinson 2016), but it is also 
maintained by the semiotics of delay. For example, neuroimaging has shown 
that as a gap after a prior turn lengthens, expectations change: we usually for-
mulate questions to favor a yes answer, which is expected at the normal ca. 200 
msec response time; if the answer no comes in at the normal response time, 
it evokes an N400 or surprisal reaction, but this evaporates over time as no 
becomes more probable (Bögels et al. 2015a).
One issue for timing of  interactions, especially when a machine is teach-
ing a human, is that human tutees often interpret a slight pause before posi-
tive or neutral feedback as signaling negative  feedback (Fox 1991, 1993). For 
instance, if a student answers a tutor’s question and then gets a slight pause 
before hearing “yes” or “umm,” the student will often infer that the answer is 
incorrect.
In general a delay in response after a response-requiring turn signals that an 
unwelcome response is likely. Withholding response after any turn can signal 
that its import was not clear. In general, then, timing is part of the signal in 
human interactions. This may be very problematic for  human–machine inter-
action, but it is worth noting that there are classes of humans, most notably 
children, who may be much slower than the human norm, and adults are pretty 
good at adjusting expectations to childhood norms. It may be better for ITL 
systems to signal their timing limitations (perhaps by junior stature) than to 
attempt to meet full normal human speed of response.
Synchronization is a low-level, probably largely unconscious, process 
whereby two agents come to coordinate. The simplest case can be modeled as 
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coupled oscillators, as when the seventeenth-century Dutch scientist Christiaan 
Huygens noted that two pendulums mounted to the same structure come to 
synchronize over time. In biological systems, quite complex behaviors, like 
the synchronized fi ring of a swarm of fi refl ies, arise in a similar way (here, by 
resetting a biological capacitor when the neighboring fi refl y turns on). Humans 
playing music together, for instance, tend to harmonize brain oscillations, thus 
providing a shared internal metronome. Finely timed coordination may well 
depend on this, but for various reasons it will rarely be suffi cient: fi ne tim-
ing may also depend on predicting the other’s action culmination and even 
preplanning one’s own productions so they are ready to go. Coordination is 
 prediction plus generation in a joint activity, requiring  mental simulation of 
the other.
Human speech communication has the distinctive property of alternating 
communication bursts between speakers. During an incoming utterance, an 
addressee may be signaled out by  gaze and normally gives feedback signals 
at major chunks of incoming material. This becomes especially obvious if 
speaker A is delivering a story which, given the turn-taking structure, is often 
implicitly negotiated at the beginning:
• A: “Did you hear what happened to Joan?”
• B: “NO, what?”
• A: [chunk1], [chunk 2], [chunk 3].
In overlap with the end of chunk 1, B is likely to say “mm”/“uhhuh” or the 
like, or nod, thereby recognizing (a) that chunk 1 has been received, (b) there 
is nothing in chunk 1 that is causing comprehension diffi culty, and (c) that B 
has nothing compelling to say at that point. The opportunity to do this recycles 
at the end of chunk 2, 3, and so on (Schegloff 1982). The class of relatively 
content-free back channel responses is fairly limited per language, with up-
graded versions also available (e.g., surprise markers “wow,”  empathy markers 
“oh dear”). These signals do not count as turns, which is why they typically 
occur in overlap. Conversely, longer phrases (less limited of course) are likely 
to count as turn initiators, leading to expectations of possible speaker switch. 
Back channels of this kind, as the name suggests, thus essentially signal “chan-
nel open, message received,” while implying by virtue of the activities that 
were not done instead (e.g., initiation of repair or a new major response) that 
full understanding has occurred. B recognizes that A is producing a longer 
stretch of speech that has not fi nished.
Through a back channel, a listener demonstrates to a speaker his/her con-
tinued interest in communication. As back channels play an important role in 
coordinating human–human conversation, it becomes important for agents to 
have a capability to generate back channels during  human–agent communica-
tion. This involves making a decision on when to generate back channels (i.e., 
the timing of back channels). In  human–human communication, back channels 
occur very fast and seem to be elicited by the speaker based on a variety of 
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prosodic, verbal, and nonverbal cues (Schroder et al. 2012). Previous works in 
conversational virtual agents have developed predictive models (e.g., sequen-
tial probabilistic models) to predict the timing of where a back channel should 
be generated (Morency et al. 2008). As there is evidence that human listeners 
generate back channels even without attending to the content of communica-
tion, these previous predictive models often only consider surface features, 
such as prosody, pause, gaze, and direction from the speaker. Their empirical 
results have demonstrated that generating back channels that are synchronized 
in time with speaker contributions is an extremely challenging task.
The nature of communication in ITL as well as in conversational virtual 
agents (e.g., in the context of social communication for negotiation, consulta-
tion, and therapy) are quite different. It is not clear whether previous work 
on virtual agents can be directly applied to ITL. The prediction may no lon-
ger depend on acoustic but rather visual features (e.g., observed from human 
demonstrations). In ITL, the chance that an agent might misunderstand task 
instructions given by a human (whether verbally or through demonstrations) 
is high. Since humans may perceive back channels as an explicit confi rmation 
of  understanding, generating back channels will need to be tightly linked to 
content processing (rather than surface cues). This could delay the appropriate 
timing for generation. Without connecting to content processing, a back chan-
nel may have a danger of leading the speaker to believe a task instruction has 
been successfully understood and then later discover otherwise, causing a high 
cost repair for the downstream communication. Thus, when to generate appro-
priate back channels in ITL remains a challenging research question.
Chao and Thomaz (2013) have shown the importance of timing control in 
 human–robot interaction and its social impact. Their work on the  CADENCE 
system shows that manipulating these  turn-taking timing parameters (e.g., 
space between acts, likelihood of interrupting the partner) results in robot be-
havior that people perceive as being signifi cantly different. Moreover, people 
attribute different personalities to the robot; changing the robot’s personality 
by manipulating these timing parameters results in different behavior from the 
human partner, thus manipulating the social dynamics of the dyad.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have considered the qualities of human interaction and 
learning that will be most effective and natural to incorporate into any ITL 
agent, specifi cally focusing on the interactions around learning from  explicit 
 instruction. We argue that this type of learning is centered around bringing 
the common ground between these two agents (teacher and learner) into 
alignment. Thus, errors drive the ITL process by triggering interaction and 
learning. Without misalignment of common ground, either through errors or 
missing knowledge, there would be no need for ITL. Finally, we highlight the 
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importance of considering timing and the dynamics of an interaction as a com-
munication channel itself, as well as emphasize the importance of analyzing 
the extent of shared capabilities between the two agents.
What all of this argues for in ITL with robotic and AI agents, is that infor-
mation from multiple short turns of interaction between the teacher and learner 
will have the best opportunity for minimizing errors in communication that 
will arise naturally. Short bursts of information between the two interacting 
partners is likely to be the most successful way to transfer task knowledge 
between the two, incrementally updating errors in common ground until the 
teacher and learner come into alignment.
